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Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, virtually all discussion of security policy in 
the United States has concentrated on the implications of those events.  In the immediate 
aftermath, there was a riveting fear of further assault, and the counterattack against the Al Qaeda 
network, assumed to be responsible, was given overriding priority.  Over its initial phase at least, 
that effort has been more effective than initially expected and has not generated the political 
backlash that was considered to be a significant risk.  The sense of imminent threat has certainly 
not been eliminated, but it has been mitigated to the point that broader implications can 
legitimately command attention – in particular the chilling realization that the disaster would 
have been far greater had mass destruction technologies been effectively used.  It is now 
embarrassingly evident that we should have been more careful about access to the controls of 
flying airplanes.  By extension we need to be more careful about things that are a great deal more 
dangerous than airplanes.  However successful the continuing suppression of terrorist 
organizations might be, it is yet more urgent to manage much better than we have both the 
materials that enable large-scale destruction and the knowledge out of which they arise.   
  
That realization was powerfully reinforced by the subsequent experience with powdered 
anthrax sent through the United States mail system.  As is now widely recognized, the material 
used in two of the four contaminated letters that have been identified could have been far more 
destructive had a more effective method of dissemination been used.  The few grams contained 
in the letters could readily have endangered thousands of people, conceivably tens of thousands. 
A kilogram of that material effectively broadcast could kill hundreds of thousands.  Authorities 
have not yet managed even provisionally to identify the person or group who sent the 
contaminated letters, let alone to determine any association with the Al Qaeda network.  The 
difficulty of answering these questions after an attack underscores the futility of expecting 
intelligence, security, and law enforcement officials to identify and eliminate all potential 
terrorists before they strike.  It becomes critically important therefore to enlist biologists, doctors, 
and other members of the scientific community in a comprehensive effort to monitor inherently 
dangerous materials, knowledge, and activities as carefully as possible.   
  
While recent events have focused attention on preventing or responding to another 
deliberate bio-attack, they also underscore the need for care that legitimate research does not 
inadvertently create even more dangerous pathogens and delivery mechanisms, or unwittingly 
enable others to do so.   It is equally important to avoid having stepped-up biodefense projects be 
mistaken for offensive programs, and to provide credible reassurance that former bioweapon 
scientists have not been tempted to abuse their expertise.  
Nuclear weapons and the fissile materials that provide their explosive power have long 
been the primary instance of mass destruction technology, and from the outset their development 
was accompanied by elaborate efforts to control access and to prevent any form of misuse. The 
various provisions of managerial control that have evolved over half a century are not adequate 
under current circumstances, particularly not in Russia, but they do reflect a sustained attempt to 
provide reasonably comprehensive protection. The degree of protection actually achieved defines 
the state of the art as it is currently practiced.  
  
In stark contrast to nuclear materials, the handling of biological pathogens has largely 
been treated as a matter of safety rather than security, and the protection provided against 
deliberately malicious use or unintentional misapplication is primitive by comparison.  Not so 
the inherent danger, however.  Knowledge of biology has developed to the point that extremely 
consequential intervention in fundamental life process has become feasible, both for good and 
for ill.  One can plausibly imagine the eradication of many historical diseases.  One can also 
envisage the creation of new diseases that would endanger a larger portion of the human species 
than is currently threatened by nuclear weapons.  With deliberate maliciousness so spectacularly 
demonstrated on September 11, some serious effort will undoubtedly have to be made to devise 
methods of protective management for biotechnology while also promoting its beneficial 
application.  
  
The process of developing advanced measures for these purposes is likely to be both 
difficult and controversial.  Protective measures will apparently have to subject the fundamental 
research process to forms of scrutiny that up to this point would have been heatedly resisted as 
inappropriate intrusion -- for reasons that have been transcended but have not disappeared.  The 
looming dangers of biotechnology will not themselves generate an effective oversight design and 
do not guarantee that the familiar litany of perverse regulatory effects can be avoided.  An 
oversight arrangement that will reliably do more good than harm in this situation is not yet 
available.  Devising such an arrangement is likely to require major conceptual innovation, a 
substantial adjustment of prevailing political attitudes, and ultimately a creative synthesis of 
scientific judgment, advanced monitoring and data management technology, legal specification 
and institutional design.  
  
Accomplishing all that will undoubtedly require time, extensive effort and very broad 
ranging discussion.  In the course of such an effort, many of the original thoughts will 
presumably be substantially revised.  Nonetheless even at the outset of this process, it is possible 
to envisage, in broad outline, a constructive outcome.    
  
Essential Features of the BW Situation 
  
Comprehension of the problem posed and visualization of a constructive response can 
both begin with a basic observation: the primary impulse in biotechnology comes from a globally 
distributed medical and agricultural research community.  Most of the fundamental work is being 
done by people with unquestionably legitimate purposes in mind and is published in open 
literature at the rate of more than a million items each year.  Dedicated weapons projects 
conducted in secrecy are a very small part of total activity and in general have not been the 
source of broadly significant scientific discovery.  It is increasingly evident that the 
understanding of basic life processes emerging from this general research effort will enable the 
human species to intervene deliberately in the course of natural evolution, a development that 
certainly appears to be a watershed in all of history.  Unfortunately that capacity is not matched 
by the ability to understand the full consequences of such intervention.  The human species has 
learned how to manipulate some of the basic rules of evolution but has a great deal to learn – 
virtually everything really -- about the extended consequences.   
  
As a result of this situation it is prudent to assume that inadvertent effects of legitimate 
research are at least as great a danger as deliberate maliciousness and are probably in fact the 
greater danger.  Those consciously dedicated to destruction are likely to choose instruments they 
understand, and their understanding is likely to be derived from widely accessible knowledge 
they did not themselves generate. Those probing the frontiers of knowledge are less likely to be 
willfully destructive but are more susceptible to unpleasant surprise, as compellingly illustrated 
by the recent mousepox experiment in Australia.1  At the moment, there are no established 
criteria for identifying which lines of research are especially dangerous and deserving of special 
scrutiny.  That determination must be made in highly detailed context and the appropriate 
response depends heavily on the intentions attributed to the people involved.  Not even the very 
best of them can transcend the limits of what they know.  
  
There are several major implications of this assessment.  
  
First, it suggests that the most serious danger does not yet exist and can still be prevented.  
The human, animal and plant pathogens that have naturally evolved and are currently known are 
not as lethal as those that can now be imagined and potentially created.  Those pathogens 
historically associated with biological weapons programs, ominous as they may be, are not as 
destructive as those that might be deliberately designed.  Even the exercises in deliberate design 
attributed to the Soviet Union’s weapons program by prominent defectors are not the worst that 
can be plausibly conceived.  That fact is beneficial in the sense that systematic prevention can in 
principle be practiced.  The monumental problems of eradication presented by massive nuclear 
weapons deployments have not yet emerged in biotechnology.   It is above all important that the 
deliberate development of advanced pathogens for belligerent purposes not be legitimized. 
  
Second, if unanticipated consequences are assumed to be a principal part of the problem, 
that presumption offers some important advantages in constructing oversight provisions.  One 
can promote them without implying suspicion of criminal intent.  One can design them on the 
assumption that most of the people affected are willing to comply as long as the rationale is 
understood and the procedures are not unduly burdensome. One can evoke as the basis for the 
arrangement the very powerful traditions of the medical community.  The commitment of that 
community to the promotion of human health and its universally acknowledged injunction to do 
no harm are arguably the human values most capable of transcending the parochial conflicts of 
interest and identity that are usually used to justify deliberate destructiveness.  If robust oversight 
practices were established among the vast majority of researchers whose purposes are legitimate, 
it would make willful violation much more difficult to accomplish than it currently is.  It would 
also make timely detection and preemptive reaction much more feasible.  More refined and 
better organized standards of behavior within the legitimate community would appear to be the 
single most effective means of providing protection against inadvertent destructiveness and are a 
necessary condition for dealing with deliberate maliciousness.  
                                                 
1 Ronald J. Jackson et al., “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses 
Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology, Feb. 
2001, 1205-1210. 
  
Third, if the scientific roots of dangerous application are so closely intertwined with 
legitimate ones that those most immediately involved can have difficulty applying the 
distinction, then a viable oversight arrangement must strike a balance between preventing danger 
and promoting opportunity.  General research techniques that promise constructive applications 
will certainly be developed even if they do pose massive danger as well.  And indeed the dangers 
will have to be directly investigated in order to understand their exact character and to assess the 
prophylactic or therapeutic actions that would be necessary if preventive measures should fail. 
The judgment required to balance these considerations must encompass the leading intricacies of 
fundamental science, the advanced practice of public health and individual medicine, major 
features of agricultural development, and areas of security policy that at best have been only 
provisionally explored.  
  
There is no categorical escape from the problem posed.  Fatal error is an inherent risk and 
recurring consequence of practicing medicine.  Capacity for destruction is an inevitable by-
product of knowledge.  Belligerent impulses certainly appear to be an enduring feature of human 
societies.  Since it is neither feasible nor desirable to reverse the momentum of biotechnology 
and since the dangers emanating from it will inexorably increase, probably quite dramatically, 
some method for managing the diverse consequences will presumably have to be developed.  
  
Existing policies and institutional arrangements cannot plausibly claim to have the scope 
of responsibility or the established competence required to manage this situation. The most direct 
effort to date to create an appropriate oversight process was embodied in negotiations to provide 
a verification and enforcement protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Those 
negotiations have just failed with no formula for resumption visible as yet.  The failure, 
moreover, is rooted in a deepening pattern of international suspicion in which the United States 
government is unavoidably implicated. The United States has issued blunt indictments against 13 
countries -- not all of them specified -- who are alleged to be conducting offensive biological 
weapons programs in violation of the BWC, but it has refused to subject all of its own activities 
to international scrutiny.  Some US government programs are credibly reported to be of the same 
character as those that form the basis of the proclaimed indictments.  Although the reports do not 
contend that the United States is actually conducting an offensive program, it clearly is applying 
a more permissive standard to itself than it extends to other countries.  Meanwhile US 
government activities are acknowledged to be to be a possible, even a likely source of the 
powdered anthrax maliciously sent through the American mail system.  
  
Even under the most charitable presumptions in this situation, independent initiative will 
clearly have to be taken within the scientific community if an appropriate and generally accepted 
oversight process for biotechnology is to be devised.  Such an initiative would be necessary 
regardless of the current background suspicion but is especially important given the fact of it, as 
responsible government officials should themselves recognize.  It is certainly a strong interest 





   
A number of domestic regulatory provisions currently in effect in the United States have 
some relevance and provide some precedent to build upon.  There are equipment requirements 
and procedural standards meant to assure adequate confinement of currently known pathogens at 
the laboratories licensed to handle them.  There are provisions for review and prior approval of 
experiments on human subjects. The process of licensing drugs and vaccines for human use 
involves extensive documentation and regulatory review of virtually all of the associated 
activities.  Registering, reporting and packaging requirements have been at least formally 
imposed since 1997 on individuals and institutions engaged in shipping dangerous pathogens 
from one place to another. Antiterrorism legislation proposed in the wake of September 11 is in 
the process of extending those regulations to cover possession of designated pathogens.  Internal 
review procedures of basic research are said to be well advanced within the major 
pharmaceutical companies, although those procedures are not externally visible and are not 
subjected to outside review.  A review of these domestic arrangements and an assessment of their 
effectiveness is being undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences, but pending the 
committee’s judgment the presumption has to be that existing procedures do not provide 
comprehensive oversight at the critical stages of exploratory research, even within the leading 
countries, let alone for the world as a whole.  If the inherent dangers of emerging biotechnology 
are as serious as they appear to be, then presumably some fundamental managerial innovations 
will have to be explored.   
  
It seems evident that effective oversight could not be achieved by the categorical exercise 
of centralized authority.  Whatever legal rules and regulatory guidelines might be promulgated, 
the success or failure of any arrangement will depend primarily on judgments applied in detailed 
context by the scientists directly involved and by qualified peers.  The problem is to induce 
awareness of the necessary judgments, set applicable standards, and provide for the timely 
exchange of information that would allow the research community as a whole to shape the 
behavior of all of its members.  That would necessarily be a distributed process, operating more 
by induced consensus than by imposed authority.  Presumably it would require some legal 
specification and the exercise of formal authority, but it would primarily depend on spontaneous 
professional and social interactions – working scientists setting and enforcing standards for 
which they accept principal responsibility.  
  
The critical element in such a process is a set of transparency rules designed to assure that 
no one could act outside the boundaries of reasonable common judgment without provoking 
corrective reaction.  Transparency in this sense is not the same as unrestricted publication, but it 
does imply informed scrutiny by those qualified to exercise it.  If that is to occur then relevant 
information has to be made available and the scientific community has to be organized to react to 
it.  There has long been a rule that no single individual is ever allowed to exercise exclusive 
control over a nuclear weapon, and elaborate organizational procedures have been devised to 
assure that rule is upheld without exception.  The corresponding rule would be that no single 
research team of whatever size or whatever institutional affiliation should conduct inherently 
dangerous experiments without independent, actively exercised oversight. 
  
In order to be reliably effective, such an arrangement would have to be global in scope.  
A pathogen emerging in any part of the world would threaten the rest, even if that were not the 
deliberate intent.  The relevant research process is not exclusively conducted in any limited set of 
countries.  Standards set within the United States or among the OECD countries would not 
provide adequate protection unless they were generally applied.  Although an advanced oversight 
arrangement would probably have to be initiated by a small number of leading countries, the 
ultimate requirement for global extension would have to be a major consideration at the outset.  
There is a presumption, therefore, that the process of designing an oversight arrangement would 




Some difficult practical problems emerge from these presumptions.  Any exercise of 
judgment runs the risk of misjudgment.  Systematic provision of detailed information designed to 
enable prudent oversight judgments could also stimulate malicious, hysterical or simply 
misguided interference with legitimate activity.  Individuals engaged in leading edge research 
will generally insist on the right to explore any promising line of scientific inquiry.  They will 
also want to assure personal credit for their accomplishments and the associated rights for 
commercial application.  They are understandably inclined to avoid outside scrutiny until these 
rights have been adequately exercised.  
  
For well-known reasons, commitments to narrowly defined interests are generally more 
intense and better organized than are commitments to broader interests. In this case that means 
that however imposing the general opportunities and dangers of biotechnology may be, intrusive 
oversight provisions undertaken on behalf of the human species as a whole would have to be 
carefully targeted against the small percentage of activity that meets agreed criteria for especially 
dangerous research and would need to be accompanied by very robust measures to increase 
positive incentives and minimize negative side-effects.  In order to be acceptable, a protective 
oversight arrangement would have to demonstrate not only that on balance it does more good 
than harm but also that whatever harm it does would not be unduly burdensome to the 
individuals and institutions directly affected.  That would require a much more refined definition 
of the respective interests than has yet been established, as well as more developed legal 
provisions for managing the competing claims. 
  
If, therefore, the inherently sensitive information that an oversight arrangement requires 
is to be provided, the agreement or requirement to disclose information must be accompanied by 
credible reassurances.  Rules of access and use must be set to protect the legitimate subordinate 
interests involved, and those rules would have to be enforced to a high standard.  If there are to 
be legal sanctions against the deliberately malicious or irresponsibly careless application of 
biotechnology, then there must be corresponding legal sanctions against the mishandling of 
information disclosed in an effort to prevent dangerous misapplications.  The familiar dangers of 
plagiarism, espionage, and mass media sensationalism would have to be adequately contained for 
any oversight arrangement to be enacted.  Doing so appears to require substantial elaboration of 
existing law and existing institutions.  It is doubtful that current law provides the legal 
specification that would be necessary to support advanced oversight provisions.  It is virtually 
certain that no existing institution has the technical capabilities for the sophisticated data 
management challenges that such a system would entail, let alone the political and scientific 
standing to be entrusted with a globally comprehensive oversight process. 
  
In addition to avoiding perverse effects, an oversight arrangement would also have to 
provide demonstrable security benefits in order to be globally acceptable.  Advocates of the 
arrangement would have to overturn the standard objection, especially prominent in the United 
States at the moment, that no arrangement that protects the interests of willing collaborators 
could also prevent dedicated violation. The contention is that bad guys cannot be stopped and 
that good guys therefore should not be bothered. It has been difficult enough to set reasonable 
standards of compliance for arms control agreements that establish quantitative force limits or 
prohibit specific activities, such as conducting nuclear explosions, regardless of whether they are 
undertaken for military or peaceful purposes.   It will be particularly difficult to agree on 
reasonable compliance standards for an arrangement designed to prevent the misuse of 
biotechnology because there is no threshold below which certain activities would be deemed 
“safe,” yet these dangerous activities can not be reliably differentiated from legitimate ones 
without addressing the inherently ambiguous problem of imputed intentions.  At least in the 
United States it will take a major change in prevailing political attitudes to establish the central 
principle that advanced oversight among the willing is a necessary condition for detecting and 
reacting to willful violations. 
  
For many people-- perhaps most people at this point -- the practical problems are grounds 
for summary rejection of the entire idea of protective oversight for biotechnology.  The 
necessary revision of prevailing political attitudes, the elaboration of applicable law, and the 
creation of a new organization without any close precedent is more than they care to try to 
imagine.  Understandable as that assessment is, however, the world as a whole and the scientific 
community in particular cannot afford for everyone to indulge in it.  The topic needs some 
venturesome pioneers.  
  
An Imaginable Outcome 
  
Despite the formidable problems, moreover, it is not difficult to visualize a 
comprehensive oversight arrangement once the compelling need for it is admitted.  The basic 
elements would be as follows:  
  
1. A substantially enhanced international program to control infectious disease 
generally. That would provide a strong positive incentive for participation, 
especially for those parts of the world already being ravaged by naturally 
generated pathogens.   
  
2. A widely accepted determination of the set of especially dangerous pathogens and 
related research activities. This would have to be an open designation to which 
new pathogens and new research activities are added as they become identified. 
The basic idea, however, would be to specify a relatively restricted set of 
activities to which special rules would apply.  
  
3. A set of requirements for registering and licensing individuals and research 
facilities involved in the especially dangerous class of activities. It would be 
illegal for any unlicensed individual or facility to possess pathogens or engage in 
scientific research in the designated class.  
  
4. A set of reporting requirements for licensed individuals and facilities 
documenting their basic purposes, their research results and the population of 
pathogens in their possession. All experiments would be reported in advance. All 
strain variations of the pathogens would also be reported.  
  
5. An international governing body authorized by appropriate majority voting rules 
to set priorities for the general effort to control infectious disease, to establish 
protocols for reaction to disease outbreaks of international concern, to designate 
the class of especially dangerous pathogens and related research activity, to 
determine basic reporting requirements including rules of access to the 
information reported, and to provide financial support for institutionalized 
implementation of disease containment and dangerous pathogen oversight.   
  
6. An international scientific commission established by the general governing body 
to conduct the infectious disease program, to issue the required licenses, to 
receive the required reports, to organize scientific oversight, to enforce access 
rules regarding the reported information, to support legitimate research in the area 
of concern, and to perform routine auditing of compliance. The commission 
would periodically submit a budget for its operations to the convention for 
approval.  In effect this would be an extension of scope and an institutionalization 
of the peer review process that is already established scientific practice.  
  
7. A set of formal inspection and enforcement provisions -- along the lines of those 
proposed for a BWC protocol but more comprehensive -- to be evoked in 
response to questionable activity that cannot be clarified by routine auditing of the 
scientific commission.  
  
In this scheme the international governing body and the scientific commission would 
basically set disclosure rules and provide financial incentives for compliance, leaving somewhat 
open the question as to how standards of behavior would be set and how they would be 
harmonized across individuals, institutions and countries.  If it proves to be possible to achieve 
progressively converging judgment on those matters without vesting central institutions with the 
authority to impose it, most members of the relevant scientific communities would presumably 
prefer that arrangement.  If consensus does not spontaneously arise under conditions of enforced 
transparency, however, then the forms of determinative authority the governing body and the 
scientific commission might reasonably be given would have to be explored.  The ability to 
withhold financial support and training opportunities is implicit in the scheme.  The ability to 
deny approval for publication might naturally be added.  Beyond that it gets more difficult, 
however, and creative thought about incentives for cooperation will be required.  To the extent 
that one worries about willfully malicious and systematically devious violation and therefore 
seeks to give the governing body and the implementing commission authoritative powers, one 
also increases the potential for objectionable intrusion in normal scientific activity.   Requiring 
that the governing body make substantive decisions by consensus would protect against an 
overly powerful international organization, but would produce lowest-common-denominator 
solutions and would preclude timely adaptation to rapid advances in biotechnology.  At any rate 
it would clearly be important to work out an appropriate and presumably evolving balance of 




In the initial stages, discussion of a comprehensive program to control existing infectious 
diseases and to prevent emergent ones would primarily be a constructive means of exploring the 
fundamental problems posed by biotechnology.  Even for those most responsive, a viable global 
oversight arrangement is likely to be seen as a distant prospect of questionable probability.  It is 
also important therefore to identify partial measures that would be constructive by themselves 
and would contribute to a comprehensive arrangement without imposing the full burden of 
development at the outset.  There are a number of partial measures that might play this role.  
  
Serious effort to complete a verification and enforcement protocol for the BWC would be 
the most obvious partial measure and arguably also the most critical.  The failure of long running 
negotiations on that subject will inevitably degrade perceived international commitment to the 
core principles of the convention.  Whatever else is done, that effect will have to be reversed and 
commitment to the convention reaffirmed among those willing to uphold it.  If the central 
provision of the convention is to survive – that is, the prohibition of offensive weapons activities 
– then the adherence of major countries to that principle will have to be less ambiguous and more 
credibly conveyed than it currently is, especially for the United States, Russia, and China.  In 
particular that means that reporting, visitation and inspection requirements must be established to 
some meaningful extent and that they must be applied to all relevant facilities of whatever size. 
Even if such requirements cannot alone provide high quality protection against competently 
concealed violation, they are important, indeed vital in setting standards among the compliant 
states.  Actively enforced standards are necessary for detecting and prosecuting violation even if 
they are not sufficient.  The appropriate criterion for assessment is not whether formal inspection 
arrangements can preclude all willful violation but rather whether they are adequate to prevent or 
to resolve residual suspicion among genuinely complaint parties.  If that much is established, 
then supplementary actions could be taken in truly troublesome cases.  As a practical matter, 
rogues cannot thrive if the legitimate community is adequately organized, and demonstrating 
compliance with unambiguous standards is the first step in being adequately organized. At a bare 
minimum, meaningful negotiations on this subject must be regenerated.  
  
Similarly it is important for the major institutions of the scientific community to initiate 
discussion of oversight procedures that might be enacted voluntarily and it would certainly be 
desirable if some exploratory efforts were organized.  Scientific discussions, voluntary 
transparency visits to sensitive locations, and cooperative threat reduction activities have 
provided some useful insights and could be expanded further. Given the magnitude and character 
of the potential danger, there will be an inherent question whether voluntary arrangements can 
provide adequate protection, but they certainly cannot do so if they are not developed. It is 
incumbent on those who object to the idea of a fully comprehensive arrangement to nominate a 
partial one that might provide adequate protection.  
  
Finally, as a substitute for continued negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC, 
the United States government has suggested a dialogue among selected countries that is 
apparently intended to improve national regulations of existing biological agents. That too 
should be explored as a partial measure, but the suggestion would have to be extensively 
developed in order to make a meaningful contribution. As originally presented it would be 
confined to regulations applied to the possession and transport of designated agents.  It would not 
address the research process capable of generating yet more dangerous agents.   
